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This paper studies a simple model of buyer investment and its effect on the variety and vertical
structure of international trade. A distinction is made between two types of buyer investment:
"flexible" and "specific." Their interactions with the entry and pricing incentives of suppliers are
analyzed. It is shown that (i) there can be multiple equilibria in the variety of products traded, and
(ii) less product variety is associated with more intrafirm trade. The possibility of multiple equilibria
is consistent with the observation that some similar economies, such as Taiwan and South Korea,
differ substantially in their export varieties to the U.S. A formal empirical analysis confirms the
negative correlation between product variety and intrafirm trade.
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Recent literature in international trade has emphasized the importance of contractual
relationships between ￿rms, and sought to explain these contractual relations by features of
the industries and host countries. For example, Antr￿s (2003) argues that in more capital-
intensive industries, a greater share of trade is intra￿rm, i.e. between a parent and its
subsidiaries. Antr￿s and Helpman (2003) analyze a more general multi-industry, multi-
country model, where the type of contracts and ownership between ￿rms will depend on
features of the industry (the productivity distribution of ￿rms) as well as features of the host
countries (such as factors prices). Similarly, Nocke and Yeaple (2004) solve for the locational
choice of foreign direct investment (FDI) by matching characteristics of the companies and
the host countries.
Missing from this literature, however, is a consideration of the buyers in the destination
market. Gary Gere¢ (1994; Gere¢ and Lin 1994) uses the term ￿big buyers￿to refer to the
mass merchandisers in the United States who, he argues, have in￿ uenced the organization of
production in Asia. As a speci￿c example, consider South Korea and Taiwan. While these
two economies export in many of the same broad industry categories, the details of their
trade are quite di⁄erent. South Korea is well-known for trying to achieve ￿world status￿in
products such as cars, microwaves, consumer electronics, dynamic random access memories
(DRAMs) and other mass-produced goods. The business groups selling these goods ￿such as
Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo ￿have become household names in the U.S. and worldwide.
Taiwan, by contrast, focuses more on intermediate inputs and customized products, selling
auto parts and bicycles rather than cars, more customized chips than DRAMs, women￿ s
fashions as opposed to men￿ s shirts, etc. Many of these goods are produced under OEM
(original equipment manufacturer) arrangements for retailers overseas, who typically require
customized designs. This is one explanation for the ￿nding that Taiwan exports a great
variety of products to the U.S. than does South Korea in many industries (Feenstra, Yang,
1and Hamilton, 1999).
Feenstra and Hamilton (2004) have recently argued that the di⁄erential export patterns
from South Korea and Taiwan are at least in part the result of increased demand generated
by regulatory changes in the United States. Speci￿cally, the repeal of ￿fair trade laws￿
in the United States during the 1960s allowed for huge increase in mass-merchandising,
orchestrated by the merchandisers acting as intermediaries between U.S. consumers and
Asian producers. This increase in U.S. demand occurred just as Korea and Taiwan were
in a position to meet that demand; but that it was exercised in di⁄erent market segments
within the two countries. Buyers began to look to Korea for the provision of long production
runs of relatively standardized products, whereas Taiwan supplied shorter production runs
of more specialized, niche products. Thus, the exercise of international demand resulted in
quite di⁄erent product varieties from each country.
To examine this hypothesis, we propose a simple model of how buyers can in￿ uence
product variety. In particular, we consider how buyer investment in input requirements
can a⁄ect the variety and vertical structure of trade for intermediate goods. The recent
literature on the organization of international trade tends to focus on situations where sellers
make investments (e.g., McLaren, 2000; Antr￿s, 2003);1 our focus on buyer investment
complements this literature. Our basic model, described in section 2, is the familiar circle
of product varieties, with upstream suppliers arranging themselves at discrete intervals.
Downstream buyers have preferred speci￿cations of the good, but can incur an investment
allowing them to more easily adapt to di⁄erent speci￿cations that are not their preferred.
Such ￿￿ exible" investment, however, reduces the incentives for upstream entry and results in
fewer upstream varieties. This tension between upstream variety and downstream ￿ exibility
can give rise to multiple equilibria in the economic organization: more (or all) downstream
buyers make ￿ exible investment and upstream suppliers produce fewer varieties; or fewer
1Models in the theory of contracts and ￿rms also tend to focus more on the investment incentives of
the sellers, but investment incentives by buyers clearly have also received attention, as, for instance, in
the general framework of Grossman and Hart (1986), and in the empirical work of Joskow (1987) where
downstream power plants can make asset-speci￿c investment by locating closer to coal mines.
2(or no) downstream buyers make ￿ exible investment and upstream suppliers produce more
varieties.2 One interesting implication of this model is that it provides an explanation
for the di⁄erent export market structures of South Korea and Taiwan, if we interpret an
equilibrium with fewer varieties as applying to Korea, and an equilibrium with more varieties
as applying to Taiwan.
In Section 3, we extend the basic model by allowing each downstream buyer to have the
additional option of making a ￿speci￿c" investment that would match its preferred spec-
i￿cation with a particular supplier￿ s (i.e., increasing the buyer￿ s match quality with the
supplier). In an equilibrium with more varieties, a buyer can expect its input needs to be
matched relatively well by a supplier, and thus there is less bene￿t to make the speci￿c
investment ex ante; the opposite is true in an equilibrium with fewer varieties. As it turns
out, more buyers can potentially bene￿t from the speci￿c investment in an equilibrium with
fewer varieties. However, there is an important distinction between a buyer￿ s speci￿c invest-
ment and ￿ exible investment: while the ￿ exible investment reduces suppliers￿market power,
the speci￿c investment increases their market power and can create the familiar hold-up
problem. Vertical integration between buyers and suppliers can serve as a mechanism to
overcome the hold-up problem and realize the gains from speci￿c investment. Consequently,
in an equilibrium with fewer varieties, where the gains from speci￿c investment are higher,
there is more vertical integration, or more intra￿rm trade. The consideration of the two
types of buyer investment, and of their interactions with the entry and pricing incentives of
suppliers, can thus lead to an equilibrium theory of variety and vertical structure in inter-
national trade. The central prediction of this theory is that there is a negative correlation
between variety and intra￿rm trade.
At an aggregate level, we know that this prediction is true for South Korea and Taiwan:
Zeile (2003, Table 2B) reports that for U.S. imports in 1997, only 9.8% of goods coming
from Taiwan were intra￿rm purchases from their foreign parent groups, whereas 32.8% of
2When the cost for ￿ exible investment is su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high, there is a unique equilibrium
where either all buyers invest or no buyer does, respectively.
3goods coming from Korea where intra￿rm purchases.3 The goal of our empirical work in
Sections 4-6 is to explore this connection between product variety and intra￿rm trade for
a broader sample of countries. Our empirical analysis uses two closely related approaches.
Our ￿rst approach builds on Antr￿s (2003), who ￿nds that countries with more capital-
intensive exports are more likely to engage in intra-￿rm trade across borders. Along with
capital intensity and in a larger data set, we add the U.S. import variety from various
countries as an explanatory variable,4 or more precisely, the unexplained portion of import
variety from that predicted from a gravity equation. We ￿nd that this variable is negatively
correlated with intra￿rm trade, as expected from our theory. In our second approach, we
include control variables for country size, distance, etc. simultaneously with estimating
the relationship between product variety and intra￿rm trade, and again ￿nd support for
the negative relationship. Conclusions and directions for further research are discussed in
Section 7.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
There are two countries, home (H) and foreign (F). There is a continuum of M ￿rms in
H, each of which needs to purchase 1 unit of an input from F. Each home ￿rm￿ s input has
an ideal characteristic that is represented by a point on a circle of unit perimeter length. In
purchasing the input, the ￿rm incurs an adjustment cost that is the product of ￿ and the
distance between its ideal point and the location of its supplier along the circle. Thus ￿ is the
unit adjustment (transportation) cost, which is a measure of how ￿ exible the downstream
￿rm is in its input requirement (or how easily the downstream ￿rm can substitute its input
between di⁄erent suppliers). A downstream ￿rm can invest (I) to increase the ￿ exibility of
3For the 1992 benchmark survey (Zeile, 1997, Table 6) reports that 4.5% of the goods coming from
Taiwan were intra-￿rm purchases from their foreign parent groups, whereas 21% of the goods coming from
Korea were intra-￿rm purchases. Evidently, the extent of intra-￿rm exports from both Taiwan and Korea
has been growing.
4As in Antr￿s (2003), we examine these contries￿exports to the U.S., and thus the variable is the same
as the U.S. import variety from these countries.





￿h if I = 0
￿l if I = k > 0
;
where 0 < ￿l < ￿h: For instance, kcould be an investment in a technology that allows greater
input substitutability. Alternatively, k may be an investment that reduces transaction costs
with potential suppliers, such as setting up an o¢ ce in F.5 Ex ante, each ￿rm￿ s ideal point
is a random variable uniformly distributed on the circle. Downstream ￿rms in H will also
be called buyers.
There are a large number of potential suppliers (upstream ￿rms) in the foreign country.
Each of them can choose to enter the market with entry cost f > 0 and produce the
input with constant marginal cost c ￿ 0: The game, in which only pure strategies will be
considered, is as follows:
￿ Stage 1. Potential suppliers simultaneously make entry decisions, and choose locations
on the circle if entry occurs.
￿ Stage 2. Each downstream ￿rm in H decides whether to invest k to increase its
￿ exibility in dealing with di⁄erent suppliers.
￿ Stage 3. The downstream ￿rms￿locations (ideal points) on the circle are realized.
The suppliers who have entered the market, observing downstream ￿rms￿locations
and whether they have invested k, simultaneously bid prices to the downstream ￿rms.
￿ Stage 4. Each downstream ￿rm accepts the o⁄er with the lowest purchasing cost
(price plus adjustment cost), and the input is produced.6
We start our analysis by considering the situation where n ￿ 2 suppliers are located on
the circle with equal distance from each other. Without loss of generality, we let supplier
5The investment could also be on the organization/marketing of production. If the downstream ￿rms are
retailers, for instance, by investing in large discount stores (shopping malls) and adopting mass retailing,
the downstream ￿rms may desire more standardized products with lower costs.
6The downstream ￿rms are assumed to value the input su¢ ciently high so that the input is always
purchased in equilibrium.
51 be located at the bottom of the circle and number suppliers and buyers in the clockwise
order. A buyer￿ s location is characterized by xi; which means that the buyer is located
immediately ahead of supplier i and its distance from i is xi:We denote supplier i by Ui.
Given any ￿ 2 f￿h;￿lg; any xi will e⁄ectively face two competing suppliers, i and i + 1
for i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1; or i and 1 for i = n: The marginal customer for supplier i is xi = 1
2n: If
xi < 1
2n; supplier i has a competitive advantage in serving xi and will supply xi at price pi;
where







The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price of ￿rm i for buyer xi is:
pi (xi) = max
￿






If portion ￿ 2 [0;1] of buyers have ￿h (investing no k); and portion 1 ￿ ￿ of buyers have
￿l (investing k); we assume that each portion will be uniformly distributed on the circle,
same as the entire buyer population. Supplier i￿ s equilibrium pro￿t, taking into account
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2n2 (￿￿h + (1 ￿ ￿)￿l) ￿ f:







where ^ ￿ ￿ ￿￿h + (1 ￿ ￿)￿l: We assume M ￿
8f
￿l ; which ensures ^ n ￿ 2:
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￿




6We next provide the justi￿cation for our focus on an upstream market structure in which
all suppliers have the same distance from each other, with the following result concerning
the location choices of suppliers at any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, all suppliers must be equally distanced from each other.
Proof. We consider the two cases where n = 2 and n ￿ 3 separately.
Case 1: n = 2: Suppose ￿rst that U2￿ s distance from U1 is y ￿ 1
2 clockwise. For any
consumer x1 and x2 of given ￿; the equilibrium prices of U2 are





c + ￿y if 0 ￿ x2 ￿ 1
2 ￿ y
maxfc; c + ￿ (1 ￿ y ￿ 2x2)g if 1




U2￿ s pro￿t is the same as U1￿ s and is equal to






















where recall ^ ￿ = ￿￿h + (1 ￿ ￿)￿l: Thus









Similar y￿ = 1
2 if we assume y ￿ 1
2:
Case 2: n ￿ 3: Suppose that the distance of supplier i + 1 to i is y; and its distance to
supplier i + 2 is l ￿ y: It su¢ ces to show that in equilibrium y = l
2; since this would imply
that there can be no equilibrium where suppliers are not located in equal distance to each
other, and furthermore by letting l = 2
n it is an equilibrium for ￿rms to locate in equal
distance to each other:
7With reasoning similar to that in Case 1, we can assume y ￿ l
2 and write the equilibrium
pro￿t of supplier i + 1 as




























and hence in equilibrium y￿ = l
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for j = h;m;l:
Then, since ￿l < ￿m < ￿h; we have nl < nm < nh:
Proposition 1 For the basic model:
(1) If k > k; the unique equilibrium is I￿ = 0 (￿￿ = ￿h) for all buyers and n￿ = nh:
(2) If k < k; the unique equilibrium is I￿ = k (￿￿ = ￿l) for all buyers and n￿ = nl:
(3) If k ￿ k ￿ k; there are three and only three equilibria: (i) I￿ = 0 (￿￿ = ￿h) for all
buyers and n￿ = nh; (ii) I￿ = k (￿￿ = ￿l) for all buyersand n￿ = nl; and (iii) for k < k < k;
I￿ = 0 (￿￿ = ￿h) for ￿m buyers while I￿ = k (￿￿ = ￿l) for (1 ￿ ￿m) buyers; and n = nm:
Proof. First, from Lemma 1, suppliers will locate in equal distance from each other in
equilibrium.
Second, if I = 0 and hence ￿ = ￿h for all buyers; then n = nh from the derivation of ^ n
given in equation (1) and the de￿nition of nh. Thus it is an equilibrium for all buyers to

















Third, if I = k and hence ￿ = ￿l for all buyers; then n = nl from the derivation of ^ n given
in equation (1) and the de￿nition of nl. Thus it is an equilibrium for all buyers to choose











Fourth, since nl < nh;we can divide k into the three mutually exclusive intervals. If
k > k; it is an equilibrium for all buyers to choose I￿ = 0 with n￿ = nh; and there can
be no other equilibrium for the following reason: If there were another equilibrium, some
buyers must choose I = k at this equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium number of ￿rms





























￿ k = 0:
Thus, if k > k; the unique equilibrium is I￿ = 0 for all buyers and n￿ = nh:An analogous
argument establishes that, if k < k; the unique equilibrium is I￿ = k for all buyersand
n￿ = nl:
Finally, to establish Part (3) of the proposition, we notice that (i) and (ii) follow imme-
diately from the second and third steps above. It is also clear that there can be no other
equilibrium where all buyers choose I = k or none does: Thus, our proof will be complete if
(iii) holds and it gives the only equilibrium where some buyers invest k and others do not.
Notice that if in equilibrium some buyers invest k and others do not, the buyers must have











(￿￿h + (1 ￿ ￿)￿l):









and n = nm ￿
q
M￿m
2f ; where ￿m = 0 if k = k; ￿m = 1 if k = k; and 0 < ￿m < 1 for
k < k < k: Therefore it is indeed an equilibrium that I￿ = 0 for ￿m buyers, I￿ = k for
(1 ￿ ￿m) buyers, and n = nm; and there can be no other equilibrium where some buyers
invest k and others do not.
Thus, for similar economies, there can be rather di⁄erent market structures in their
exports: some with a relatively large number of small suppliers, each producing a small
quantity; and others with a smaller number of larger suppliers, each producing a larger
quantity. This provides an explanation of the di⁄erent market structures of export sectors
in South Korea and Taiwan. When buyers become more ￿ exible in their input require-
ments, there are less incentive for variety and more incentive for lowering average cost in
the upstream industry. This seems to be the case for Korea, where buyers from the US
looked for long production runs of relatively standardized products. In the case for Taiwan,
international buyers appeared to have demanded shorter production runs of more special-
ized, niche products; and this provides incentive for more upstream entry and the provision
of more varieties. Our analysis captures an interesting tension between upstream variety
and downstream ￿ exibility, which has not been noticed in the literature before.
While the circle model is well known in the product di⁄erentiation literature, ours has two
distinctive features, namely ￿ can be changed through investment and the locations of buyers
are observed by sellers in price competition. These features seem especially natural in the
intermediate-goods market, where the identities of buyers are usually known by suppliers,
and where a buyer is likely to be able to invest in technologies or to make arrangements that
a⁄ect the cost to change suppliers.7 Our analysis would be similar if the locations of the
7The considerations here are related to the approach in Chen (forthcoming), who studies the incentives
for, and e⁄ects of, marketing innovations by producers of ￿nal goods that increase their abilities to gather
consumer information or reduce consumer transaction costs.
10downstream ￿rms were not observable, but then the equidistant locations of the suppliers
would need a justi￿cation that is di⁄erent from our proof for Lemma 1.8 An advantage of
our formulation is that the location choices of ￿rms (locating equidistantly) is established
as the equilibrium outcome of the game with linear transportation cost.
We can shed some light on the welfare property of the equilibrium choice of I: The
expected procurement cost of any downstream ￿rm is given by
z =
8
> > > <
> > > :
c +
3￿h
4nh if I￿ = 0 for all buyers and n￿ = nh
c +
3￿h
4nm = c +
3￿l
4nm + k if ￿m buyers choose I￿ = k and n￿ = nm
c +
3￿l
4nl + k if all buyers choose I￿ = k and n￿ = nl
:
If buyers were able to act jointly in committing to an I in the beginning of the game, then




















And, since c +
3￿h
4nm > c +
3￿h
4nh due to nm < nh; it would not be optimal for some buyers to






































4nl; we must also have k < k





it is still possible that in equilibrium I￿ = k: This ine¢ cient "over-investment" by the buyers




4nl < k < k; and can occur as one of the
equilibria if k ￿ k ￿ k: We therefore have:
8To our knowledge, in the literature on product di⁄erentiation, the equidistant result in the circle model
has been shown as the equilibrium of a location game only with quadratic transportation costs.
11Corollary 1 In equilibrium, buyers￿choice of I￿; the input ￿exibility investment, minimizes







or k > ￿ k:
Otherwise I￿ = k can occur in equilibrium but buyers￿procurement costs are not minimized.
Interestingly, while the ability to invest in the ￿ exibility of input requirements can bene￿t
the buyers, sometimes it also makes them worse o⁄. Such investment intensi￿es competition
among any given number of suppliers and reduces the rents needed to cover their entry
costs. For fear of this, there will be less entry of suppliers, resulting in less variety in the
intermediate-goods market and less competition there, which makes it indeed desirable for
the buyers to invest in input ￿ exibility. The ine¢ ciency arises since the ￿ exible investment
by the buyers has a negative externality on the suppliers, which the buyers do not internalize.
In equilibrium, the suppliers correctly anticipate this and reduce entry. The problem is that
buyers cannot collectively commit not to invest k: Such commitment, for instance, would
not be possible if contracting for k is not feasible.
3. SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND VERTICAL STRUCTURE
In our basic model, the upstream and downstream ￿rms are by assumption independently
owned. We now extend the basic model to allow the vertical structure in international
trade to be determined endogenously, so that in equilibrium some ￿rms may be vertically
integrated. We modify Stage 2 of the basic model as follows: At Stage 2, each buyer ￿rst
learns to which supplier it is located closest (or, equivalently, which one of the segments of
length 1
2n on the circle it belongs to), even though its precise location is not realized until
Stage 3. We shall call an upstream ￿rm the favored supplier of the downstream ￿rms to
which it is located closest. Second, each buyer can invest s to position its ideal point at the
location of its favored supplier,9 where s is the realization of a continuous random variable
9This is a crude way of introducing the idea that a buyer can invest to increase her match quality with a
supplier, for instance, through adjusting its input requirement, adopting a particular technology, providing
speci￿c employee training, or marketing e⁄orts promoting the supplier￿ s product.




4nl + k < s:10 Third, the
supplier is unable to commit to any price that it will charge the buyer, but it can vertically
integrate with the buyer.11 Fourth, the buyer can still invest k if it wishes. Everything else
in this extended model is the same as in the basic model.
It is immediately clear that, if no buyer invests s; the analysis and the equilibrium of the
game will be exactly the same as in the previous section. In particular, since the expected
procurement cost for any buyer on any of the segments of length 1
2n is the same, knowing
which segment it belongs to will not change the buyer￿ s decision on whether or not to invest
k:
If in equilibrium n￿ = nl; then the expected procurement cost of a buyer without investing
s (but investing k) is c +
3￿l





(pi (xi)dxi ￿ c):
If
s + c < c +
3￿l
4nl












+ k ￿ s1;
then investing s (and not investing k) will lead to a higher joint surplus between this pair
of buyer and supplier. However, if the buyer invests s; it will be subject to the well-known
hold-up problem since the supplier has not committed to its price. Because the buyer
making the speci￿c investment will be further away from other suppliers; it expects to pay





4nl +k will not be needed if we are only concerned with multiple equilibria
for the same industry: For comparisons of di⁄erent industries, this assumption ensures that k is not too














11We assume that vertical integration can possibly occur only if at least one party strictly bene￿ts from
it, even though for simplicity we assume that there is no additional cost associated with vertical integration.
We can easily add a cost for vertical integration and reduce s by this cost, without changing the result of
our analysis.
13integration can solve this hold-up problem and realize the potential gains from the speci￿c
investment. With vertical integration, for convenience we assume that the downstream ￿rm
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the upstream ￿rm, and we allow two possible processes of
vertical integration between downstream ￿rms and their favored supplier: In the ￿rst case,
one downstream ￿rm purchases the upstream ￿rm while the other integrating downstream
￿rms sell their businesses to the upstream ￿rm, resulting in a vertically integrated ￿rm that
is owned by a buyer. In the second case, all vertically integrating downstream ￿rms sell their
businesses to their favored supplier, resulting in a vertically integrated ￿rm that is owned by
the supplier.12 Under either case, vertical integration will not change the expected earnings
of the upstream ￿rms and hence not the equilibrium number of upstream producers, because



















which is the same as its expected earnings from any downstream ￿rm who is within the 1
2nl
distance and who does not invest s (but invests k; consistent with n￿ = nl): Therefore, if in
equilibrium n￿ = nl; a mass of MG(s1) buyers will vertically integrate with suppliers, or
MG(s1) amount of H0s imports from F will be intra￿rm imports.




; then the expected


































Vertical integration (together with investing s by a downstream ￿rm) will occur if and only
12For our purpose, we do not consider the issue of how ownership rights should be assigned within a ￿rm.
We simply assume that vertical integration solves, or at least alleviates, the hold-up problem. However, the
propety rights approach (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986) has suggested that the ownership rights should be
assigned to the party that makes the investment, which, in our case here, is the buyer.
14if



















+ k ￿ s2:
Thus, if in equilibrium n￿ = nm; a mass of MG(s2) buyers will vertically integrate with
suppliers, or MG(s2) amount of H0s imports from F will be intra￿rm imports. Note that
s2 =
3￿l￿2￿m
4nm + k =
3￿h￿2￿m





Finally, if in equilibrium n = nh; then the expected procurement cost of a downstream





Vertical integration (together with investing s by a downstream ￿rm) will occur if and only
if




















Thus, if in equilibrium n￿ = nh; a mass of MG(s3) buyers will vertically integrate with
suppliers, or MG(s3) amount of H0s imports from F will be intra￿rm imports.
Summarizing the discussion above and using results from Proposition 1, we can charac-
terize the equilibrium in the extended model as follows:
Proposition 2 In equilibrium of the extended model:
(1) If k > ￿ k; the unique equilibrium is: n￿ = nh; MG(s3) buyers vertically integrate with
suppliers and invest only s; while the rest of buyers remain vertically separated and invest









< k < k; the unique equilibrium is: n￿ = nl; mG(s1) buyers vertically
integrate with suppliers and invest only s; while the rest of buyers remain vertically separated
and invest only k:
(3) If k ￿ k ￿ k; there are three equilibria: the two equilibria characterized above, and a
15third equilibrium (for k < k < k) where n￿ = nm; mG(s2) buyers vertically integrate with
suppliers and invest only s; while the rest of buyers remain vertically separated, ￿m portion
of them investing nothing and 1 ￿ ￿m portion of them investing only k.
Proposition 2 provides the basis for an interesting relationship between product variety





















If k < k or k > k; we have s1 > s3 since


















Corollary 2 Corresponding to the possible equilibrium numbers of product varieties nl <
nm < nh; the amounts of vertical integration, or of intra￿rm trade, are respectively MG(s1) >
MG(s2) > MG(s3): That is, more product varieties are associated with lower intra￿rm
trade.
This negative correlation between variety and intra￿rm trade holds whether the parameter
values of our model allows a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria. Intuitively, the
speci￿c investment allows a buyer to improve its match quality with its favored supplier.
When the number of suppliers is large, the buyer can expect its input needs to be matched
relatively well by the supplier, and thus there is relatively low bene￿t to make the speci￿c
investment. On the other hand, when the number of suppliers is low, a buyer expects to
incur more substantial adjustment cost to meet its input requirement, and thus there is
high bene￿t from the speci￿c investment. Consequently, in the latter case, the marginal
buyer who can potentially bene￿t from making speci￿c investment corresponds to a higher
s; implying that there are more such buyers. However, while the ￿ exible investment reduces
the expected price for the buyer ex post, the speci￿c investment raises this price due to
16the hold-up problem. Vertical integration is needed as a mechanism to solve the hold-up
problem and realize the gains from speci￿c investment.13
Our assumption that the downstream ￿rms appropriate all the gains from vertical in-
tegration signi￿cantly simpli￿es the analysis. Under this assumption the upstream ￿rms
will receive the same payo⁄ in this extended model as in the basic model (with or without
vertical integration), so the incentive for entry in the upstream market is not changed; as a
result, there is no change for the conditions on k for the equilibrium number of suppliers:
If the upstream ￿rms￿payo⁄s increase as a result of vertical integration, there will be addi-
tional upstream entry in equilibrium; this will complicate the analysis, but need not change
the qualitative nature of our results.
Corollary 2 o⁄ers a testable prediction about product variety and intra￿rm trade: import
variety of the home country is negatively correlated with the amount of intra￿rm trade
(imports). We next test this predication empirically.
4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
To test the hypotheses developed above, we make use of the data in Antr￿s (2003),
who considered intra￿rm imports from 28 countries to the United States, in 1992. He used
Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA) data to construct intra￿rm imports to the U.S. in
manufacturing industries. His hypothesis was that intra￿rm imports should be higher in
capital-intensive industries or from capital-abundant countries, which was supported by the
regressions that he runs. In addition to the capital-intensity of industries, Antr￿s controls
for factors such as human capital, corporate tax rates, and the openness of countries to
trade and FDI.
Our key hypothesis is that a higher product variety of imports, such as coming from
13Note that if H imports from several F countries, then other factors that a⁄ect variety may need be
controlled in order to make across-country comparisons. For instance, an F country that is closer to H or
that is larger may export more variety to H while at the same time also allow lower s for the buyers in H;
causing more vertical integration (intra￿rm trade). Such considerations will be important for our empirical
analysis later.
17Taiwan as compared to Korea in their sales to the U.S., are associated with lower intra￿rm
imports. The measure of import variety we shall use follows closely the approach of Feenstra
(1994). He develops an index of product variety that is consistent with a CES aggregator
function, even when that function is not symmetric across goods. This measure of product
variety has been utilized recently by Borda and Weinstein (2004), for example, who consider
the increasing variety of imports coming into the United States. Hummels and Klenow also
use the CES measure of trade variety, and call it the ￿extensive margin￿ of a country￿ s
exports (as contrasted with the ￿intensive margin,￿which would be the quantity of exports
rather then variety). Feenstra and Kee (2004) have recently studied how export variety
from various countries to the U.S. impacts those country￿ s aggregate productivity.
In order to test the relationship between product variety and intra￿rm imports, however,
it is important to control for other factors that in￿ uence import variety. Simple proximity
of a country to the U.S., as well as sheer size of a country, will both lead to higher variety.
We can control for these factors using two, closely related approaches. In the ￿rst approach,
we estimate a gravity equation where the dependent variable is import variety to the U.S.
from a partner country. The residuals from this gravity equation will then be used as an
explanatory variable for intra￿rm imports, in a regression that also includes the capital-
abundance of countries and other explanatory variables used by Antr￿s. Under this ￿rst
method we are simply adding a new variable ￿unexplained product variety ￿into the same
regressions used by Antr￿s. The motivation for using unexplained product variety as a
regressor, rather than total product variety, is the same as our motivation for using Taiwan
and Korea as comparison: we want to control for other factors that would in￿ uence product
variety and intra￿rm trade.
In the second approach to estimation, we include control variables for country size, dis-
tance, etc. simultaneously with estimating the relationship between product variety and
intra￿rm imports. Because both of these variables are endogenous in our theory, in the
second approach we use total product variety as the dependent variable, with the controls
and intra￿rm imports on the right. This approach has the bene￿t of estimating unexplained
product variety and its relationship to intra￿rm trade in a single equation. Since intra￿rm
18trade is itself endogenous, we use instruments that come from the original Antr￿s regression,
i.e. countries￿capital and labor endowments.
In the next section we provide some details on the CES measure of import variety,
which we measure for 104 countries selling to the U.S. in 1992 (the year of Antr￿s￿data)
and 1997. The later year is added since measures of intra-￿rm imports for the U.S. in 1997
are now available from the BEA (Zeile, 2003), but these data were not available to Antr￿s
(2003). Thus, we are able to double the size of the dataset used for estimation. The BEA
reports data on imports shipped by overseas a¢ liates to their U.S. parents, and imports
shipped to U.S. a¢ liates by their foreign parent groups. Following Antr￿s, we initially focus
on the sum of these two series for majority-owned a¢ liates. Unlike Antr￿s, however, we do
no necessarily restrict ourselves to manufacturing industries, but consider intra￿rm sales to
manufacturing and wholesale industries.
5. MEASUREMENT OF IMPORT VARIETY
Let Pc
t denote the value of a CES unit-cost function de￿ned over the prices of all product














; bi = a￿
i > 0; c = 1;:::;C: (2)
and pc
t > 0 is the domestic price vector for each country, and we assume ￿ > 1. Notice that
the bi parameters allow for asymmetric demand for the products.
The function (2) cannot be evaluated without knowledge of the parameters bi. But a
standard result from index number theory is that the ratio of CES function can be evaluated,
using data on price and quantities in the two periods or two countries. Feenstra (1994) shows
how this result applies even when the number of goods is changing. In particular, the ratio
of the CES aggregator functions over two countries a and b, equals to the product of the
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; for c = a;b: (6)
Notice that the cost shares in (5), for each country, are measured relative to the common
set of goods I. Then the weights in (4) are the logarithmic mean of the shares sa
it (I) and
sb
it (I), and sum to unity over the set of goods i 2 I.
The ￿rst term on the right of (3) is the Sato (1976)-Vartia (1976) price index, which is
simply a weighted average of the price ratios, using the values wi (I) as weights. What is
new about equation (3) is the second term on the right, which re￿ ects changes in product
variety. If country c in period t has new, unique products (not in the common set I), we
will have ￿c
t < 1. From (3), when ￿ > 1 then ￿c
t < 1 will lower the price index of imports,
Pa
t =Pb
t . In other words, the introduction of new import varieties will act in the same way
as an reduction in prices from that country, providing a welfare gain to consumers.
In practice, we will measure the ratio ￿a
t=￿b
t using the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS)
classi￿cation of U.S. imports. To measure the ratio ￿a
t=￿b
t, we need to decide on a consis-
tent ￿comparison country.￿For this purpose, we shall use the worldwide imports from all




t is the complete set of varieties imported by the United States in year t.
Then comparing country c to country * in year t, it is immediate that the common set of
goods exported is Ic
t \I￿
t = Ic
t, or simply the set of exported by country c. Therefore, from
(6) we have that ￿c

























20Noting from (3) that product variety in country c relative to the comparison is measured
as ￿c
t=￿￿
t, we will instead invert it and obtain a direct measure of import variety from country
c relative to the world, as ￿￿
t=￿c
t = ￿￿
t. The interpretation of ￿￿
t in (7) is that it is the share
of worldwide imports into the U.S. from products that are sold by country c. Equivalently,
it is one minus the share of worldwide imports from products that are not sold by country c.
Note that this measure depends on the set of products sold by country c, Ic
t, but not on its
value of imports to the U.S., except insofar as they a⁄ect the value of worldwide imports.
We use (7) as our measure of import variety from each country c to the United States, and
it is the same as what Hummels and Klenow (2002) call an "extensive margin.".
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We ￿rst estimate a gravity equation for 104 countries selling to the United States, in 1992
and 1997, with the results shown in column (1) Table 1. Explanatory variables included
in the gravity equation are GDP per capita as well as population in each partner country,
along with distance to the U.S. (all in natural logs), and these are all signi￿cant at the
1% level. We also add several indicator variables: for a common border with the U.S.;
for OECD members; OPEC members; and having English as the primary language14 The
OPEC and English language indicators are both insigni￿cant, but the other variables are
highly signi￿cant.15
We construct the residuals from column (1) and label them as ￿variety residual￿ . This
variable will be used as an explanatory variables in our ￿rst empirical approach, which
builds upon the country regression used by Antr￿s (2003, Table V), and is described in
Tables 2 ￿4. The remaining regressions in Table 1 will be discussed under our second
empirical approach.
14These indicator variables are used by Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001), from whom we obtain the
distance measures.
15The indicator variable for common border is also signi￿cant, but has an unexpected negative sign. This
may be o⁄setting the larger positive coe¢ cient on the OECD indicator, which might be over-predicting the
impact of OECD membership for Canada on export variety sold to the U.S.
21First Empirical Approach
Focusing for a moment on the 28 countries considered by Antr￿s (2003) for 1992, in
Figures 1 and 2 we graph import variety and the variety residual, respectively, against the
intra￿rm imports from each country.16 Antr￿s uses the intra￿rm imports within manufac-
turing industries, so that is what we show on the horizontal axis in Figures 1 and 2. The
vertical axis of Figure 1 is the import variety from each country in their sales to the U.S.
As suggested by Figure 1, import variety is positively correlated with intra￿rm imports, as
is con￿rmed if it is included as an additional variable in the country regressions of Antr￿s
(2003). The countries with the highest product variety of sales to the U.S. include Canada,
Mexico and the U.K., and these countries also have high intra￿rm imports. But we believe
that the positive raw correlation between product variety and intra￿rm trade is determined
by third factors, such as proximity for Canada and Mexico and common language with the
U.K., that co-determine product variety of trade with the U.S. and foreign direct investment.
In Figure 2 the vertical axis measured the variety residual, after controlling for the vari-
ables in the gravity equation. The variety residual appears to be negatively correlated
with intra￿rm imports, as is con￿rmed if the variety residual is included in the country
regressions of Antr￿s (2003). We report versions of these regressions below that expand
on the number of countries and years used in the estimation, and also modify the measure
of intra￿rm imports that is used. Antr￿s (2003) focuses on intra￿rm imports within man-
ufacturing industries of the U.S., in 1992, since manufacturing most closely matches his
theory. But our theory is well suited to include sales to wholesale industries, too. So we use
intra￿rm imports to the U.S. in both manufacturing and wholesale industries, measured as
a percentage of total U.S. imports from that foreign country, as reported by Zeile (1997,
2003) for 1992 and 1997.17
16The data used in these Figures is reported in the Appendix.
17It turns out that the results using just intra￿rm imports in manufacturing, or intra￿rm imports in
manufacturing plus wholesale industries, are quite similar, which is why we do not make the distinction. By
including both sectors we can use the reported data in Zeile (1997, 2003), which is available for a broader
sample of countries than used by Antr￿s. Regressions similar to Table 2, but using just manufacturing and
22In Table 2, we use intra￿rm imports as the dependent variable, summing over sales by
foreign a¢ liates to their U.S. parents and sales by foreign parents to their U.S. a¢ liates.
The explanatory variables used are the same as in Antr￿s (2003): regression (1) uses the
capital-labor ratio of each country; regression (2) adds the labor stock; regression (3) adds
the human capital-labor ratio; regression (4) adds the corporate tax rate, and the following
regressions add indexes of openness to FDI, to trade, and overall economic freedom. It can
be seen that the variety residual is not signi￿cant initially, but become highly signi￿cant as
more controls are added. It is negatively correlated with intra￿rm trade, as suggested by
our theory. The capital-labor ratio, which is the key variable suggested by Antr￿s￿model,
retains its positive and signi￿cant sign as the number of observations are expanded from
his sample.
In Table 3 we use U.S. parents imports from their foreign a¢ liates as the dependent
variable, and in Table 4 we use U.S. a¢ liates imports from their foreign parents. In Table
3, the variety residual is negative and signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. But the capital-labor
ratio loses its signi￿cance entirely. So when U.S. parents are importing from their a¢ liates
abroad, the theory we have presented here appears to hold quite well, whereas the positive
relationship between capital-intensity and intra￿rm trade, as posited by Antr￿s, does not
hold. Antr￿s argues that having capital-intensive production exacerbates the ￿hold up￿
problem between ￿rms, making vertical integration more likely. The capital-labor ratio
included in these regressions applies to the partner country, but when only the a¢ liate
is located there, it may be specialized in a narrow range of activities as compared to the
parent and therefore not have the same capital-intensity of production. This may explain
why Antr￿s hypothesis is not con￿rmed. The theory presented in this paper is based on
investment by the buyer, so it is natural to expect this theory to hold when the buyer is
the parent ￿rm, and therefore dominant in the relationship.
When we consider U.S. a¢ liates imports from their foreign parents in Table 4, then
there is a very strong positive relationship with capital-intensity. In this case, the high
capital-labor ratio of the foreign country applies to location of the foreign parent ￿rm,
just the 28 countries used by Antr￿s for 1992, are available on request.
23which appears to be a better way to measure the relevant capital-intensity in production,
thereby con￿rming Antr￿s￿theory. The negative relationship between the variety residual
and intra￿rm trade also holds, supporting our own hypothesis, but is only signi￿cant when
some controls are added.
Second Empirical Approach
So far, we have followed Antr￿s in using intra￿rm imports as the dependent variable in
our regressions. Both that variable and product variety are endogenous in our theory, so
we can equally well use product variety as the dependent variable. Such an approach has a
major advantage in that we can then include the control variables in the gravity regression
simultaneously with using intra￿rm trade as an explanatory variable. Furthermore, we
can take account of the endogeneity of intra￿rm trade by using instruments suggested by
Antr￿s, i.e. the factor endowments of countries. This is the approach we pursue now, with
results reported in the remaining columns of Table 1.
The gravity equation in column (1) of Table (1) is estimated over a wide cross-section of
countries, and we would like to retain the same broad coverage when including intra￿rm
trade as a regressor. The di¢ culty, however, is that many countries do not report any
intra￿rm trade with the U.S. in the BEA surveys, and so are not included in Zeile (1997,
2003). We presume that these countries have minimal intra￿rm trade, and then construct
the ratio of intra￿rm trade to total country imports as:




ln(intra￿rm imports/country imports) if reported by BEA
￿t if intra￿rm imports are not reported by BEA in year t
Under this formulation, ￿t denotes the natural log of the (intra￿rm imports/country im-
ports) ratio for countries not reporting to the BEA.
In order to include ￿t in our estimation, it is convenient to break up the intra￿rm
24import ratio into two distinct variables, as follows:




ln(intra￿rm imports/country imports) if reported by BEA
0 if intra￿rm imports are not reported by BEA in year t
and,




0 if intra￿rm imports are reported by BEA in year t
1 if intra￿rm imports are not reported by BEA in year t
Now the parameter ￿t becomes the estimated coe¢ cient on the missing intra￿rm indicator
variable.
In column (2) of Table 1, we report the gravity equation using the log of import variety
as the dependent variable, and including the intra￿rm import ratio and missing intra￿rm
indicator as de￿ned above. The coe¢ cient of intra￿rm imports is negative, but very small in
magnitude and insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The coe¢ cient of the missing intra￿rm
indicator is also negative, and highly signi￿cant. The negative estimate of ￿t should be
interpreted as an estimate of (intra￿rm imports/total country imports) for the missing
countries that is less than one percent, so its natural log is negative.18
In column (3) of Table 1, we correct for the endogeneity of the intra￿rm imports by
using instruments for this variable: the capital-labor ratio, labor endowment, and human
capital-labor ratio for each country. These are the same variables used by Antr￿s (2003), as
taken from Hall and Jones (1999). When constructing the ￿rst-stage value of the intra￿rm
import ratio, we use instruments only for those observations that have positive intra￿rm
imports. That is, we construct the variable:




Predicted value of ln(intra￿rm imports/country imports)
0 if intra￿rm imports are not reported by BEA in year t
The predicted value of ln(intra￿rm imports/country imports) is obtained from a regression
like that shown in column (3) of Table 2, but omitting the variety residual variable. That
18Notice that we measure (intra￿rm imports/total country imports) as a percentage, so Canada appears
as about 45, for example.
25regression has 88 observations, re￿ ecting intra￿rm trade for roughly 44 countries reported
by the BEA in 1992 and 1997. We then add the zero value for the other (207 ￿44) = 163
observations included in the gravity equation.
Using the predicted intra￿rm import ratio, along with the missing intra￿rm indicator, the
results are shown in column (3) of Table 1. The intra￿rm import ratio is still negative, and
is now signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This con￿rms our hypothesis that intra￿rm trade
is negatively correlated with product variety, after controlling for other factors. Notice,
however, that the negative coe¢ cient on intra￿rm trade is sensitive to the fact that we
have also included the missing intra￿rm indicator variable in the gravity equation: if that
indicator variable is dropped, then the coe¢ cient of the intra￿rm import ratio switches from
negative to positive.
In the remaining two regressions reported in Table 1, we consider narrower measures of the
intra￿rm import ratio. In column (4), we use only U.S. parent￿ s intra￿rm imports from their
foreign a¢ liates, measured relative to country imports, to construct the intra￿rm import
ratio. In column (5) we use only U.S. a¢ liate￿ s intra￿rm imports from their foreign parents,
measured relative to country imports, to construct the intra￿rm import ratio. These two
speci￿cations are the same as the dependent variables that we used in Tables 3 and 4. The
intra￿rm import ratio is negative and signi￿cant in both cases, con￿rming our hypothesis.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has studied a simple model of buyer investment and its e⁄ect on the variety
and vertical structure of international trade. The model distinguishes between two types of
buyer investment: ￿￿ exible" and "speci￿c". An analysis of these two types of investment,
and of their interactions with the entry and pricing incentives of suppliers, yields two major
insights. First, the tension between upstream variety and downstream ￿ exibility can give
rise to multiple equilibria in the variety of products traded. While our empirical analysis
does not explicitly address the issue of multiple equilibria, this theoretical result is consis-
tent with the observation that Taiwan and South Korea, despite the similarities in their
26underlying economies, have very di⁄erent structures of export varieties to the U.S. Second,
since the potential gains from speci￿c investment is higher with less product variety, and
since vertical integration can serve as a mechanism to overcome the hold-up problem un-
der speci￿c investment, less product variety is associated with more intra￿rm trade. This
implication of our theory is supported by the result from our formal empirical analysis.
The negative correlation between variety and intra￿rm trade is an interesting ￿nding of
this paper. In view of Figure 1, this is a rather surprising result, since the two variables
appear on the surface to be positively correlated in a raw data. Our empirical analysis is
able to uncover this relationship, suggested from our theory, by controlling for other factors
that could in￿ uence these two variables. This is a case that clearly demonstrates the power
of combining theoretical analysis with empirical work, where the empirical work is pursued
in a direction that is otherwise overlooked.
There are several interesting directions for future research. One possibility is to further
expand our model to allow a consideration of the internal organization of the ￿rms involved
in intra￿rm trade, such as how the control rights are allocated within a ￿rm. Another pos-
sibility for future work is to expand our model to allow the downstream ￿rms the additional
possibilities of producing or purchasing the intermediate goods internally or domestically. It
would also be interesting to consider the e⁄ects of downstream competition on the vertical
organization of international trade. These extensions could potentially shed new light on
the mode of international acquisitions or foreign direct investment, as well as on the motives
for and e⁄ects of intra￿rm trade and international outsourcing.
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Switzerland  64.1  107.9  60.7  1.02 
Singapore  55.4  56.2  55.1  2.62 
Ireland  53.7  55.7  39.7  0.49 
Canada  45.1  82.4  93.9  0.92 
Netherlands  42.2  79.1  58.3  0.85 
Mexico  41.7  28.4  81.1  1.08 
Panama  35.8  19.8  19.6  0.95 
U.K.  33.2  50.4  88.9  0.53 
Germany  31.9  89.4  81.8  0.78 
Malaysia  30.1  23.5  48.8  2.70 
Belgium  27.3  76.5  58.0  1.58 
Brazil  25.9  21.2  60.9  0.42 
France  21.6  84.9  82.2  1.06 
Sweden  16.8  72.8  57.1  1.18 
Spain  15.5  61.6  53.7  1.38 
Australia  15.5  88.1  62.7  0.77 
Japan  14.2  64.2  85.8  1.75 
Israel  12.4  51.8  44.8  2.69 
Hong Kong  11.2  29.1  54.8  2.68 
Philippines  8.4  8.0  44.2  2.19 
Italy  8.1  82.3  79.8  2.90 
Argentina  5.1  33.2  35.9  1.16 
Colombia  4.6  15.4  36.4  3.34 
Taiwan  4.6  26.2  59.3  4.12 
Venezuela  1.4  42.7  37.2  1.94 
Chile  1.3  22.5  20.8  2.47 
Indonesia  1.3  8.1  43.3  4.36 
Egypt  0.1  3.4  21.4  0.98 
Average  22.4  49.5  55.9  1.75 
 
Notes: 
Intrafirm trade is the sum of imports shipped by overseas affiliates to their U.S. parents, 
and import shipped to U.S. affiliates by their foreign parent groups, measured as a 
percentage of total U.S. imports from that foreign country, as reported by Antràs (2003).  
Capital/labor endowment of each country is for 1988, where the capital stock is measured 
in $thousands per worker, as reported by Hall and Jones (1999).  The import variety 
measure is constructed as in (6), and the variety residual is the residual from the gravity 
equation in columns (1) of Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Gravity equation for U.S. imports,  
by partner countries, 1992 and 1997 
 
Dependent variable: Product Variety 
    (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
U.S. GDP per capita  1.456 3.053**  3.193**  3.206**  2.936** 
   (1.85) (4.44) (4.69)  (4.85)  (4.34) 
GDP per capita  0.185** 0.134** 0.142**  0.146**  0.146** 
   (10.61) (8.25)  (8.52)  (8.32)  (9.48) 
Population  0.270** 0.153** 0.137**  0.146**  0.122** 
   (8.66) (5.45) (4.82)  (5.67)  (4.16) 
Distance to U.S.  -0.318** -0.189  -0.187  -0.230*  -0.217* 
   (2.72) (1.87) (1.82)  (2.32)  (2.13) 
Common border  -0.593** -0.366  -0.255  -0.107  -0.674** 
   (2.81) (1.78) (1.22)  (0.46)  (3.38) 
OECD member  0.885** 0.647** 0.769**  0.640**  0.820** 
   (8.28) (6.13) (7.45)  (6.79)  (7.49) 
OPEC member  0.012 -0.136 -0.084  -0.005  -0.015 
   (0.03) (0.45) (0.27)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
English Language  0.171 0.122 0.142  0.155  0.056 
   (1.45) (1.19) (1.41)  (1.54)  (0.57) 
Intrafirm import ratio   -0.061  -0.328*  -0.252*  -0.357** 
    (0.86)  (2.54)  (2.35)  (4.16) 
Missing intrafirm    -1.147**  -1.909**  -1.448**  -1.754** 
 indicator   (4.87)  (4.77)  (6.44)  (8.05) 
Observations  207 207 207  207  207 
R-squared  0.61 0.71 0.72  0.73  0.72 




All variables except indicators are measured in natural logs.  The residuals from column (1) are 
used as variety residual in Tables 2 – 4.    Columns (1) and (2) are estimated with OLS, while 
columns (3) – (5) uses instruments (K/L, L and H/L) for positive values of intrafirm imports, as 
explained in the text.  The intrafirm indicator variable equals one if intrafirm imports are not 
reported by BEA, and zero otherwise.  In column (4), we use only U.S. parent's intrafirm imports 
from their foreign affiliates, measured relative to country imports, to construct the intrafirm 
import ratio.  In column (5) we use only U.S. affiliate's intrafirm imports from their foreign 
parents, measured relative to country imports, to construct the intrafirm import ratio.  These two 
specifications are the same as the dependent variables that are used in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 2:  Regressions of Intrafirm Trade,  
by partner countries, 1992 and 1997 
 
Dependent variable:  Intrafirm imports relative to country imports, 
U.S. affiliate and U.S. parent imports 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(K/L)  0.489** 0.490**  0.434**  0.388** 0.269** 0.579** 
  (0.072) (0.069)  (0.079)  (0.095) (0.094) (0.142) 
Ln(L)   0.001  -0.005  -0.022  -0.027  0.048 
    (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.066) (0.063) (0.081) 
Ln(H/L)      0.315  0.576 0.312 0.763 
      (0.301)  (0.472) (0.515) (0.532) 
Corporate tax       -3.206**  -2.817*  -3.397* 
        (1.146) (1.131) (1.325) 
Open FDI          -0.143 
          (0.075) 
Open Trade          0.109 
          (0.097) 
Econ freedom         0.204**   
         (0.069)   
Variety Residual  -0.178  -0.178  -0.215  -0.509** -0.473** -0.477** 
  (0.122) (0.122)  (0.126)  (0.138) (0.139) (0.154) 
Constant  -1.872* -1.900  -1.490  0.221  0.352  -2.675 
  (0.768) (1.072)  (1.192)  (1.893) (1.848) (2.622) 
Observations 88 88  88  70 70 64 
R-squared  0.41 0.41  0.43  0.52 0.57 0.61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable differs from that used by Antràs (2003), since it includes sales of foreign 
companies to their manufacturing and to their wholesale affiliates in the U.S.  Except for Variety 
Residual, which is the residual from the gravity equation in column (1) of Table 1, all the other 
explanatory variables are the same as in Antràs (2003). Table 3:  Regressions of Intrafirm Trade,  
by partner countries, 1992 and 1997 
 
Dependent variable:  U.S. parent's intrafirm imports from their  
foreign affiliates, relative to country imports 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(K/L)  0.295  0.313  0.128  -0.101 -0.263 -0.113 
  (0.154) (0.165)  (0.150)  (0.123) (0.149) (0.218) 
Ln(L)    0.032  0.015  -0.197 -0.203* -0.096 
    (0.090)  (0.089)  (0.100) (0.099) (0.156) 
Ln(H/L)      1.018  0.177 -0.182 0.374 
      (0.515)  (0.507) (0.593) (0.714) 
Corporate tax        -0.593 -0.064 -1.202 
        (1.982) (2.049) (2.066) 
Open FDI          -0.088 
          (0.147) 
Open Trade          0.289 
          (0.152) 
Econ freedom         0.278*   
         (0.124)   
Variety Residual  -0.493* -0.493* -0.604**  -0.551* -0.502* -0.597* 
  (0.231) (0.232)  (0.215)  (0.217) (0.226) (0.283) 
Constant  -0.850 -1.531  -0.222  6.638*  6.817** 3.947 
  (1.648) (2.613)  (2.503)  (2.674) (2.524) (4.810) 
Observations 87 87  87  70 70 64 
R-squared  0.12 0.13  0.18  0.17 0.24 0.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable differs from Table 2 in that it only includes imports by U.S. parents from 
their foreign affiliates.  Except for Variety Residual, which is the residual from the gravity 
equation in column (1) of Table 1, all the other explanatory variables are the same as in Antràs 
(2003). Table 4:  Regressions of Intrafirm Trade,  
by partner countries, 1992 and 1997 
 
Dependent variable:  U.S. affiliate's intrafirm imports from their  
foreign parents, relative to country imports 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(K/L)  0.738** 0.711**  0.673**  0.744** 0.740** 0.990** 
  (0.104) (0.111)  (0.106)  (0.142) (0.130) (0.127) 
Ln(L)    -0.039 -0.044  0.061 0.061 0.126 
    (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.079) (0.079) (0.084) 
Ln(H/L)     0.210  1.013*  1.004*  1.268** 
      (0.346)  (0.465) (0.452) (0.311) 
Corporate tax        -5.421** -5.410** -5.495** 
        (1.097) (1.096) (1.135) 
Open FDI          -0.034 
          (0.073) 
Open Trade          -0.045 
          (0.095) 
Econ freedom         0.007   
         (0.073)   
Variety Residual  -0.079 -0.084  -0.109 -0.476**  -0.475**  -0.323* 
  (0.124) (0.126)  (0.129)  (0.149) (0.154) (0.138) 
Constant  -5.167** -4.283*  -3.988*  -5.285  -5.286 -8.663** 
  (1.110) (1.766)  (1.798)  (2.742) (2.771) (2.620) 
Observations 86 86  86  69 69 64 
R-squared  0.48 0.48  0.48  0.66 0.66 0.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable differs from Table 2 in that it only includes imports by U.S. affiliates 
from their foreign parents.  Except for Variety Residual, which is the residual from the gravity 
equation in column (1) of Table 1, all the other explanatory variables are the same as in Antràs 
(2003).  
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